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The Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: 





¶1 ―The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race.‖1  Chief Justice Roberts‘s statement in Seattle Schools2 captures the 
dominant contemporary and historical legal approach to diversity that has existed since 
Justice Harlan‘s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,3 introducing the concept of a 
colorblind Constitution.
4
  Since at least the time of Plessy there has been a large group of 
colorblind proponents that advocates that the law should be colorblind as a means to 
achieving equality under the law.  The legal definitions extracted from debates among 
legal scholars and captured in judicial opinions highlight the importance, in the minds of 
many, of ridding the law (and society in general) of racial categories that divide and lead 
to negative outcomes on the basis of these divisions. 
¶2 Like judges and legal scholars, social scientists define colorblindness, doing so 
similarly, but somewhat more precisely than their legal counterparts.  For example, some 
social scientists define colorblindness has been defined as an ―ideology in which all 
people [are] to be judged as individual human beings[] without regard to race or 
ethnicity.‖5  Another approach ―focuses on ignoring cultural group identities or realigning 
them with an overarching identity.‖6  Like the definitions coming from the legal domain, 
these definitions highlight the importance of de-emphasizing group distinctions in order 
to achieve a higher good of considering all people as individuals rather than simply 
members of social categories like race.  The assumption underlying a colorblind approach 
is that as long as people do not ―see‖ categories such as race, they cannot discriminate on 
the basis of them. 
¶3 Not everyone agrees that colorblindness is possible or that it is the ideal approach 
to diversity.  In the legal field, the debate has taken the form of arguments in favor of 
                                               
* JD/PhD candidate in Social Psychology, 2012, Northwestern University Department of Psychology and 
School of Law.  For their helpful comments, I thank the editorial staff of the Northwestern Journal of Law 
and Social Policy, especially Lauren Matecki and Zachary Luck. 
1 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
2 Id. 
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
4 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.‖). 
5 Carey S. Ryan, Jennifer S. Hunt, Joshua A. Weible, Charles R. Peterson & Juan F. Casas, Multicultural 
and Colorblind Ideology, Stereotypes, and Ethnocentrism Among Black and White Americans, 10 GROUP 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 617, 618 (2007). 
6 Flannery G. Stevens, Victoria C. Plaut & Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, Unlocking the Benefits of Diversity: All-
Inclusive Multiculturalism and Positive Organizational Change, 44 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 116, 119 
(2008).  
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either colorblindness as articulated by Justices Roberts or Harlan, for example, or in favor 
of race consciousness.  Prominent legal scholars on the side of race consciousness have 
argued for the law to be race-conscious in light of the reality that people have been and 
remain race-conscious,
7
 as well as the facts of existing racial inequalities.
8
 
¶4 In the social sciences, the debate between colorblindness and race consciousness 
has also occurred, with an emphasis on the efficacy of colorblind and multicultural 
ideologies or mindsets for reducing prejudice and discrimination and improving 
intergroup relations.
9
  In recent years, psychologists have conducted research on the 
psychological implications of these approaches in terms of basic psychological processes 
like person perception and attitudes toward social groups. 
¶5 In an effort to bridge the gap between the theoretical discussion in the legal field 
and the empirical discussion in psychology, this Comment will review the arguments 
made on both sides of the legal debate, as well as the empirical evidence that suggests 
something about the true efficacy of colorblind versus race-conscious (or multicultural) 
approaches to dealing with diversity. 
¶6 This Comment argues: (1) colorblindness is, under most circumstances, 
undesirable given its recently discovered negative outcomes, particularly for the very 
groups or individuals it is meant to protect; (2) true colorblindness is unrealistic given the 
psychological salience of race; and (3) race consciousness in the law is necessary to 
ensure equal treatment of racial groups in regulated domains such as housing, education, 
and employment. 
¶7 Part II of this Comment reviews the legal debate around colorblindness and race 
consciousness, with an analysis of where it has been and where it currently stands.  Part 
III reviews the psychological literature examining how we cognitively construct and use 
categories, with an emphasis on the salience and inevitability of racial categorization.  
Categories are the basis for making racial distinctions, and thus, understanding how 
categories operate psychologically is an important foundation for understanding the 
debate about colorblindness.  In addition, the psychology of categories is helpful to 
understanding why the negative effects of colorblindness described in Part IV might 
occur despite the good intentions of those wishing to adopt a colorblind perspective. 
¶8 Part IV reviews the psychological literature examining the efficacy of colorblind 
versus multicultural approaches in various realms of interracial or intergroup contact, 
including stereotyping, expression of prejudice, and interracial interactions.  The relative 
advantages and disadvantages of colorblindness and multiculturalism will be explored 
through an examination of the empirical evidence testing these approaches.  
¶9 Finally, Part V analyzes the current legal debate around colorblindness versus race 
consciousness in light of recent psychological research.  Part V will conclude by arguing 
that since true colorblindness is unrealistic and undesirable in important ways, the law 
                                               
7 See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). 
8 Black America Reports, Report Sees “Sobering Statistics” on Racial Inequality, CNN.COM, Mar. 25, 
2009 [hereinafter Sobering Statistics], http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/25/black.america.report/index.html 
(citing statistics showing that blacks are two times as likely to be unemployed, three times as likely to live 
in poverty, and more than six times as likely to be imprisoned compared to whites.). 
9 See, e.g., Destiny Peery & Jennifer A. Richeson, Broadening Horizons: Considerations for Creating a 
More Complete Science of Diversity, 21 PSYCH. INQUIRY 146 (2010); Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Science: 
Why and How Difference Makes a Difference, 21 PSYCH. INQUIRY 77 (2010). 
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should be race-conscious in order to move society closer to achieving the racial equality 
so desired by proponents of colorblindness and race-consciousness alike.  
II. THE LAW AND COLORBLINDNESS 
A. Historical Case Law and Colorblindness 
¶10 The anti-discrimination principle likely led to colorblindness in the law10 by 
representing a ―moral principle [in the law] that prohibits discrimination.‖11  Proponents 
of this principle argue that it was born out of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment
12
 and later enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
13
  The anti-
discrimination principle was once considered very much in line with the concept of 
colorblindness, and in fact, it was argued by some that the anti-discrimination principle 
necessitated a colorblind approach.  The most famous example of this comes from Justice 
Harlan‘s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.14  In stating, ―Our constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,‖15  Harlan argued that the anti-
discrimination principle required the Constitution and law generally to be colorblind.
16
  
Because the anti-discrimination principle requires the law to avoid discriminating against 
individuals on the basis of group or category membership when it comes to affording 
individuals rights and privileges guaranteed by the law, it also recommends equal 
treatment (in other words, color or other category blindness) when it comes to affording 
treatment.  
¶11 Just as Justice Harlan‘s dissent in Plessy articulated the relationship between the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the anti-discrimination 
principle,
17
 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
18
 which followed three years 
after the Fourteenth Amendment, also contained language aimed at putting in place a 
colorblind, anti-discrimination principle.
19
  Section 1983, despite relying on race-neutral 
language like the Fourteenth Amendment,
20
 has been used mostly to enforce the anti-
discrimination principle by providing a basis for claims against alleged perpetrators of 
discrimination, particularly racial discrimination.  Thus, both the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Section 1983 were policies that, when applied, considered race despite their 
technically race-neutral construction.  In addition, cases leading up to the civil rights era 
challenging discriminatory practices in housing, education, employment, and other 
                                               
10
 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (containing a full discussion of the history 
of the colorblind ideal in U.S. constitutional history, including its link to the anti-discrimination principle).  
11 John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The 
Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 428 (2002).  
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . equal protection of the laws.‖) 
(emphasis added). 
13 Hasnas, supra note 11, at 428; see also KULL, supra note 10.  
14 163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896). 
15 Id. at 559. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
19 The language of this section prohibits private parties, including individuals, from depriving other persons 
of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.  Id.  
20 Both refer only to ―persons,‖ which has been construed to protect racial groups, for example, but does 
not require such a construal given the race-neutral construction. 
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domains of social life relied on the previously established link between the anti-
discrimination principle and colorblindness to argue that colorblindness was required in 
order to remedy an explicit denial of rights in those areas.  
¶12 Brown v. Board of Education powerfully articulated the relationship between 
colorblindness and the anti-discrimination principle.
21
  The Court‘s holding in Brown 
relied strongly on the idea that the way to avoid perpetuating existing racial inequalities 
and racial segregation was to stop separating people on the basis of race, as doing so was 
inherently discriminatory.
22
  Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Brown, further 
advocated colorblind thinking about the Fourteenth Amendment when he wrote, ―The 
most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to 
remove all legal distinctions among ‗all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States.‘‖23   The civil rights movement and the legislation that accompanied it, namely the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,
24
 began to erode the relationship between the existing anti-
discrimination principle and colorblindness.  Up to that point, key legal decisions closely 
linked the ideals of anti-discrimination and colorblindness.
25
  The civil rights movement 
began to explicitly differentiate between the two on the basis that colorblindness was 
insufficient to uphold equal protection under the law and to guarantee equal rights and 
privileges.
26
  Instead, civil rights advocates argued that law and policy must take race into 
account in order to ensure that the implementation of legally-required colorblindness (in 




¶13 The conflict between the values of freedom and egalitarianism without the 
consideration of racial distinctions on the one hand and the reality of a historical legacy 
of racial bias and persistent maintenance of racial bias during this time, on the other hand, 
created the ―new American dilemma of race.‖28  This ―new‖ dilemma, the conflict 
between egalitarianism and the realities of racial inequality, also created a conflict 
between the need to avoid seeing race to appear egalitarian and the need to see race in 
order to remedy inequality.
29
 
B. Contemporary Case Law and Colorblindness 
¶14 Contemporary considerations of the tension between egalitarianism and existing 
racial inequality do not resolve the tension between the anti-discrimination principle and 
the colorblind ideal that still exists.  Three cases in particular represent the current state of 
the colorblind ideal in case law and the continued relevance of the conflict of ideals and 
                                               
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
22 Id. at 495 (―Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.‖). 
23 Id. at 489 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV); see also id. at 490 (―In the first cases in this Court 
construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as 
proscribing all state-imposed discriminations on the Negro race.‖).  
24 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
25 See, e.g., KULL, supra note 10. 
26 Id. at 183.  
27 Id.  
28 James M. Jones, Psychological Knowledge and the New American Dilemma of Race, 54 J. SOC. ISSUES 
641, 643, 645 (1998). 
29 Id.  
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realities identified by the new American dilemma of race.  Seattle Schools,
30
 Grutter v. 
Bollinger,
31
 and Ricci v. DeStefano
32
 all set out colorblindness as the only acceptable path 
to achieving racial equality despite the continued debate about colorblind versus race-
conscious approaches to diversity.  
¶15 The plaintiffs in Seattle Schools33 challenged a program designed to integrate the 
public school system.  Public school officials in Seattle used white and non-white 
classifications as factors in school assignments.  In order to help balance and integrate the 
most popular schools, the challenged school assignment system gave some students 
preference for assignment to the most popular schools on the basis of their race (in other 
words, if a child‘s race or ethnicity was underrepresented, he or she was more likely to be 
assigned to the school than a white student).
34
  Parents of children denied admission to 
their preferred school filed suit, claiming that the plan implemented by the district 
violated the guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
35
  
¶16 The Supreme Court struck down the district‘s system for integrating its schools.36  
The crux of the Court‘s opinion hinges on Chief Justice Roberts‘s underlying theory that 
the way to rid society of discrimination is to stop discriminating (in other words, 
distinguishing in any sense) on the basis of race.
37
  Justice Roberts‘s approach is a 
colorblind one.  He argues that distinctions on the basis of race are inherently bad when 
present in a society striving for equality.
38
  Roberts views race as a forbidden 
classification because he believes that racial categories prevent people from thinking of 
others as individuals rather than simply members of their racial groups.
39
  
¶17 Furthermore, the majority opines that allowing the Seattle School District to 
consider race would interfere with the ―ultimate goal‖ of eliminating the use of race and 
other ―irrelevant‖ social categories in government decision-making.40  Justice Thomas 
relies heavily on Justice Harlan‘s colorblind analysis in Plessy41 to support the court‘s 
holding, arguing that (1) the Constitution is colorblind, and that (2) any form of racial 
preference or classification on the basis of race, even if meant to increase racial diversity, 
violates the principle of Constitutional colorblindness.
42
 
¶18 The Seattle Schools opinion cited to Grutter v. Bollinger,43 a case involving a suit 
by an applicant denied admission to the University of Michigan‘s law school.  That 
institution‘s admissions policy required officials to evaluate applicants in light of test 
scores and GPAs, as well as ―soft‖ variables that contribute to the student body‘s 
diversity, broadly defined.
44
  In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the university‘s 
                                               
30 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
31 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
32 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
33 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
34 Id. at 710. 
35 Id. at 710–11. 
36 Id. at 711. 
37 Id. at 748. 
38 Id. at 746. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 730. 
41 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
42 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 748–81 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
43 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
44 Id. at 315. 
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admission policies because the law school had taken a holistic approach by using a race 
―plus‖ system of consideration45 that emphasized diversity in consideration of candidates 




¶19 The majority and minority in Grutter v. Bollinger articulate reservations about 
upholding the University of Michigan Law School‘s admission policy, and those qualms 
evince their belief in a colorblind ideal.
47
  The majority suggested that while race-
consciousness is necessary now, as race-neutral policies become sufficient to provide for 
a representative and diverse student body, race-conscious policies should be immediately 
terminated.
48
  Justice O‘Connor wrote that ―we expect that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.‖49  
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reveals its optimism that racial discrimination, the 
wrong which affirmative action was meant to address, is becoming less prevalent. 
¶20 The dissenting and concurring opinions in Grutter echo the reservations of the 
majority, although more strongly.  For example, the dissenting opinions refer to the 
practices of Michigan‘s law school as ―discrimination.‖50  Relying on the colorblind 
principle first identified by Justice Harlan in Plessy, Justices Thomas and Scalia argue 
that allowing such discrimination on the basis of race weakens the colorblind ideal 
underlying both the Declaration of Independence
51
 and the Equal Protection Clause
52
 as 
put forth by Justice Harlan.
53
  
¶21 Despite the majority allowing, for the time being, the University of Michigan to 
consider race in the midst of an amorphous and vague admissions policy, the majority 
and minority opinions converge on the idea that Michigan‘s policy violated the ideal 
principle of colorblindness.
54
  All of the decisions argue that American society should 
strive towards achieving the colorblind ideal that would deem this type of policy 
unnecessary sooner rather than later.
55
 
¶22 The most recent case at the Supreme Court level addressing colorblindness and the 
anti-discrimination principle is Ricci v. DeStefano.
56
  In Ricci, white firefighters from 
New Haven, Connecticut, sued their employer, the New Haven Fire Department, for 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
57
  The Fire Department 
decided to throw out a promotion exam because it discriminated against black and 
Hispanic firefighters.  The white firefighters claimed that decision constituted 
discrimination against those white firefighters who did not receive a promotion after the 
Department threw out the exam.
58
  The white firefighters argued that the Fire Department 
                                               
45 Id. at 336, 341. 
46 Id. at 335–36. 
47 Id. at 338. 
48 Id. at 342–43. 
49 Id. at 343. 
50 See, e.g., id. at 387–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
51 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (―[A]ll men are created equal.‖). 
52 See source cited supra note 12. 
53 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting in part). 
54 Id. at 306. 
55 Id.  
56 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
58 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658. 
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intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of their race.
59
  Specifically, the 
white firefighters asserted that but for their race, the exam would not have been thrown 
out and they would not have been denied promotions.
60
  The Fire Department, for its part, 
stated that it threw out the exam to avoid a Title VII discrimination claim by the black 
firefighters under a theory of disparate impact.
61
 
¶23 Justice Kennedy, delivering the Court‘s opinion, opined that the fire department‘s 
actions were impermissible, unless it could show ―a strong basis‖62 that a disparate 
impact claim was possible and thus needed to be avoided.
63
  Kennedy‘s opinion pitted 
disparate treatment claims against disparate impact claims,
64
 suggesting that employers 
must be aware of racial disparities in employment outcomes (for example, promotions 
and hiring), but employers cannot address those disparities unless it is relatively certain 
that they will be held liable for them.
65
  The Court explicitly said, ―the City was not 
entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the racial disparity in the results.‖66 
¶24 The decision in Ricci represents a reemergence of the strong relationship between 
the colorblind ideal and the anti-discrimination principle observed prior to the civil rights 
era.  This shift back toward a strong association between these two principles endangers 
contemporary approaches to the anti-discrimination principle as it challenges the ability 
to use race in order to remedy racial inequalities.
67
  Furthermore, the majority in Ricci 
created a new standard (―strong basis‖)68 for addressing racial disparities in the 
workplace, but not without creating fear of possible legal liability from either action or 
inaction.  By pushing a colorblind approach, the new standard confuses those making a 
good faith effort to avoid discrimination by prohibiting them from preventing 
discrimination against one group out of fear of discriminating against another. 
C. Contemporary Legal Scholars and Colorblindness 
¶25 Despite contemporary case law‘s advocacy for the colorblind ideal, legal scholars 
continue to debate whether colorblindness or race-consciousness best addresses racial 
inequalities.  The primary argument of those who advocate for race-consciousness is the 
same one that was prominent during the civil rights movement.  Namely, they argue that 
race-consciousness is necessary to achieve equal treatment (in other words, 
colorblindness in practice) in key areas of ongoing inequality.  However, legal scholars in 
favor of the colorblind ideal argue that it is race-consciousness itself that leads to 
continued racial inequalities. 
                                               
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 2664.  
62 Id. at 2662. 
63 Id.  
64 Disparate treatment claims are brought on the basis of explicit unequal treatment between different 
groups, whereas disparate impact claims are brought on the basis of differential outcomes between different 
groups resulting from a facially-neutral policy or procedure.  See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1964); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
65 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2662. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 2662. 
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¶26 One argument made for race-consciousness, as suggested above, is that race-
conscious law is necessary to monitor our commitment to colorblindness with respect to 
equal access to resources like housing, education, and employment.
69
  This argument 
asserts that legal mechanisms can only prevent discrimination on the basis of race in 
these regulated domains and address institutionalized inequalities resulting from 
historical discrimination if it is possible to monitor race and hold liable those who 
discriminate on the basis of race.
70
  For example, Professors Alexander Aleinikoff and 
Cheryl Harris argue that instituting a colorblind approach permits American society to 
ignore or excuse the existing racial inequality in part because monitoring would be 
disallowed in a colorblind system.
71
  In other words, if the law prohibits classification on 
the basis of race, which presumably could prohibit recording any information about race 
(for example, census counts of racial group membership), it would be impossible to 
prevent ongoing and future discrimination even in those domains where race predicts 
disparate outcomes because no action would be possible without some monitoring for 
ongoing discrimination. 
¶27 Another argument for race-consciousness is that it avoids the problem of denial of 
discrimination.  In other words, it prevents complete denial of the history and legacy of 
discrimination and its effects on those minority groups who have long suffered from its 
detrimental effects.  For example, Professor John Duncan argues that it is the denial of 
this legacy that, in part, makes a colorblind approach so unappealing to minority groups, 
as it represents a denial of an identity that is influenced by a history of discrimination.
72
  
¶28 Finally, those in favor of race-consciousness argue that colorblindness is a strategy 
by which the majority can protect and maintain its status by maintaining the 
discriminatory status quo in its favor.
73
  Majority group members may be motivated, in 
part, to advocate for a colorblind approach because it allows them to avoid 
acknowledging or remedying inequalities while maintaining their relative advantages.  
For example, Professor Reva Siegel argues that colorblindness allows individuals, 




D. Where Does the Law Stand? 
¶29 While legal academics continue to debate amongst themselves about the virtues of 
the colorblind ideal, the Supreme Court has moved firmly in the direction of advocating 
for a resurgence of the colorblind ideal as the only means to truly eradicating racial 
discrimination and disparities.
75
  The Supreme Court may be motivated both by the desire 
to enforce the anti-discrimination principle and by a desire to view the admittedly great 
                                               
69 See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL L. REV. 907 (2006); T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991). 
70 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 69. 
71 Id. 
72 John C. Duncan, Jr., The American “Legal” Dilemma: Colorblind I/Colorblind II—The Rules Have 
Changed Again: A Semantic Permutation, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 315 (2000). 
73 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse 
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000). 
74 Id.  
75 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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strides already made toward racial equality as sufficient to begin dismantling the very 
system of law that made those strides possible.  The Court even goes so far as to claim 
that American society‘s progress towards racial equality is on track now to achieve 
further equality without intervention by the courts in the form of race-conscious law and 
policy. 
¶30 Unfortunately, the Court has not fully considered whether colorblindness actually 
leads to the racial equality it is intended to produce and support.  A review of the 
empirical social psychological literature suggests that the story of colorblindness is more 
complicated than that presented by the optimistic, and possibly overly idealistic, judges 
who favor this approach. 
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CATEGORIES: HOW AND WHY WE SEE RACE IN THE FIRST PLACE 
¶31 To put it simply, people are not colorblind.  Basic cognitive and social 
psychological research demonstrates that people use many types of social categories, 
including race, and the use of categories is adaptive and functional when dealing with the 
complex, social world in which we all live.
76
  In other words, it is necessary for people to 
use relatively simple categories to aid efficient navigation of life‘s complexities. 
¶32 In his research focused on understanding the creation and hierarchies of categories 
generally, Professor Gregory Jones has studied the distinction between basic and non-
basic categories, and found that basic categories, in particular, aid in making cognitive 
processing easier.
77
  Basic categories are those that are sufficiently inclusive (in other 
words, they do not include or exclude too many potential category members) and those 
that have multiple common attributes that make sorting people (or objects) into those 
categories possible by comparing the number of shared attributes between the group and 
the potential category member.
78
  In addition, basic social categories, like race and 
gender, are often automatically activated upon encountering social targets (in other 
words, other people) and allow for easier processing of the social world.
79
  
¶33 This research suggests that categories are not inherently bad as has been argued by 
Supreme Court Justices like Roberts and Thomas.  Rather, this research suggests that 
categories are a necessary part of human cognitive processing of the world around them.  
It is certainly the case, as suggested by Chief Justice Roberts,
80
 that people cannot 
discriminate against people belonging to different groups if there is no recognition of 
different groups, but it is not the recognition of groups in and of itself that leads to 
discrimination.  For example, positive outcomes for intergroup contact have been 
observed where approaches to diversity that recognize and appreciate differences are 
utilized.  This research suggests that even when the groups interacting are historically 
socially-stratified, such as racial groups, it is not inherently problematic to notice or even 
                                               
76 See, e.g., C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About 
Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93 (2000). 
77 Gregory V. Jones, Identifying Basic Categories, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 423, 423 (1983). 
78 James E. Corter & Mark A. Gluck, Explaining Basic Categories: Feature Predictability and Information, 
111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 291, 301 (1992).  
79 C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Categorical Person Perception, 92 BRITISH 
J. PSYCHOL. 239 (2001). 
80 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 748 (―The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race.‖). 
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use race as information in social interactions.
81
  In addition, children (even babies) have 
been shown to notice and sort people into categories on the basis of skin color long 




¶34 In addition to using categories adaptively to navigate our social worlds, it is likely 
nearly impossible to avoid noticing basic social categories like race and gender, 
regardless of whether it is adaptive or not.  That is, even if a social category is not 
relevant for a particular interaction, the categories are still processed by social perceivers.  
Further, visible social categories such as race and gender are particularly likely to be 
noticed quickly and automatically,
83
 and this makes such recognition relatively immune 
to disruption even with the good intentions that may accompany a colorblind approach.
84
  
Research at the neurological level shows that race is cognitively processed the fastest of 
all categories—even more quickly than gender—occurring in mere fractions of a 
second.
85
  Again, it is important to remember that this basic process, particularly when it 
occurs automatically and quickly, is not the underlying issue, as suggested by proponents 
of colorblindness.  Rather, racial categorization serves as a starting point that may lead to 
prejudice and discrimination, but this path to prejudice and discrimination is not 
automatic. 
¶35 In addition to the psychological realities of racial salience, race is just as salient a 
social and cultural phenomenon.  Much of U.S. history is characterized by stratification 
on the basis of race and conflicts over racial and ethnic identity, group status, and access 
to resources.  Thus, race continues to predict key social outcomes in areas such as 
housing, education and employment where government intervention has long sought to 
remedy this stratification.
86
  Some groups tend to fare better than others, and the 
maintenance of racial inequalities leads to the continued salience of race.  As a result, 
minority group members continue to feel the often negative impact of their racial 
backgrounds on their identities, life experiences, and outcomes, while majority group 
members continue to receive privileges on the basis of theirs.
87
   
                                               
81 See, e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Seeing Race and Seeming 
Racist? Evaluating Colorblindness in Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918 (2008).  
82 See, e.g., D. J. Kelly, P. C. Quinn, A. M. Slater, K. Lee, L. Ge & O. Pascalis, The Other-Race Effect 
Develops During Infancy: Evidence of Perceptual Narrowing, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1084 (2007); 
MARGUERITE A. WRIGHT, I‘M CHOCOLATE, YOU‘RE VANILLA: RAISING HEALTHY BLACK AND BIRACIAL 
CHILDREN IN A RACE-CONSCIOUS WORLD (1998). 
83 Tiffany A. Ito & Geoffrey R. Urland, Race and Gender on the Brain: Electrocortical Measures of 
Attention to the Race and Gender of Multiply Categorizable Individuals, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 616 (2003). 
84 See, e.g., id. (demonstrating that it takes mere milliseconds for the brain to register the category 
memberships of social targets along dimensions of race, which are unlikely to be disrupted by motivational 
intentions). 
85 Id.  
86 Sobering Statistics, supra note 8. 
87 See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, WOMEN‘S 
INTERNATIONAL  LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, July/August1989,  
http://www.libary.wisc.edu/EDVRC/docs/public/pdfs/LIReading/InvisibleKnapsack.pdf. 
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IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLORBLINDNESS 
¶36 For several decades, social institutions, such as the educational system and legal 
and political domains, have been interested in learning to build tolerance across group 
lines and eradicate prejudice and discrimination directed at minority groups.
88
  While the 
interest is often construed broadly in terms of how to deal with diversity of any kind, in 
the United States, concerns about diversity are rooted in a history of racial strife 
characterized by institutionalized inequalities that have only been erased at blatant levels 
in the last couple decades.  Many years at this point have been dedicated to the 
development and testing of diversity programming aimed at fostering positive intergroup 
relations and decreasing intergroup bias.
89
  Only recently has the field of psychology 
taken up the task of considering the psychological implications of these diversity 
measures.  Within the last ten to fifteen years, psychologists have become interested in 




¶37 The two major approaches to dealing with diversity have been colorblindness and 
multiculturalism, as discussed throughout this Comment.  The research comparing these 
two approaches has largely considered how much each approach reduces expressions of 
prejudice and stereotyping, given that this is a primary aim of diversity ideology 
generally.
91
  More recent research, however, has considered the distinction between 
explicit and implicit forms of bias,
92
 as well as the effects these ideologies have on actual 
interracial interactions from the perspective of participants (both majority and minority 
group members).
93
  A review of this literature will highlight the differences between 
colorblindness and multiculturalism not only in terms of the tenets of the two approaches, 
but also in terms of their collective effects on intergroup contact.  This review should 
inform the debate about colorblindness and race-consciousness in the law by 
supplementing the intuitions of legal scholars with empirical data showing the actual 
efficacy of these two approaches in eradicating racial inequality and improving race 
relations.  
                                               
88 See, e.g., J. W. Schofield, The Colorblind Perspective in School: Causes and Consequences, in 
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (J. A. Banks & C. A. McGee Banks eds., 2007); 
D. W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139 (2008); J. M. Jones, 
Psychological Knowledge and the New America Dilemma of Race, 54 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 641 (1998). 
89 See, e.g., STEVEN BREWSTER, MOLLY BUCKLEY, PHILLIP COX & LOUISE GRIEP, PLAN: NET LIMITED, 
DIVERSITY EDUCATION RESEARCH PROJECT: LITERATURE REVIEW (2002),  
http://culture.alberta.ca/humanrights/publications/docs/LiteratureReview.pdf.  
90 See studies cited infra Part IV.A. 
91 See, e.g., Christopher Wolsko, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bernd Wittenbrink, Framing 
Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-Blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and 
Individuals, 78 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635 (2000), available at  
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/bernd.wittenbrink/research/pdf/wpjw00.pdf.  
92 Implicit bias refers to bias resulting from automatic cognitive processes and often occurs outside of 
awareness.  Explicit bias refers to bias that is conscious and explicitly stated by the holder of that bias. See, 
e.g., Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindness 
on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004). 
93 See, e.g., Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers, Evan P. Apfelbaum, Natassia Pura & Dan Ariely, 
Colorblindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing the Political Correctness Game, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 949 
(2006).  
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A. The Ease and Efficacy of Colorblind Versus Multicultural (Race-Conscious) 
Approaches to Diversity 
¶38 Many laypersons and courts consider colorblindness a comparatively easy strategy 
to adopt because it purportedly only requires that one not ―see‖ race.94  In addition, one 
can simply claim to not see race and then not mention race, and the illusion of 
colorblindness is created.  The introductory quote by Justice Roberts is illustrative.  
Roberts suggests that the best way to avoid negative intergroup divisions is to avoid 
intergroup divisions in the first place.
95
  
¶39 On the other hand, multicultural approaches require greater effort.  They require 
acknowledging both similarities and differences, while simultaneously avoiding the 
negative effects that may stem from noticing differences between groups.
96
  While 
colorblindness is an intuitively easier strategy for many people to conceptualize and 
utilize at a superficial level,
97
 it is in fact far more difficult to put into practice than 
people tend to realize.  People are not, after all, colorblind and wishing that were the case 
does not make it so.
98
  With this premise in mind, research has investigated just how 
colorblind people actually are when encountering intergroup contact situations. 
¶40 Professor Christopher Wolsko and his colleagues conducted one of the first 
psychological experiments comparing colorblind and multicultural ideologies and their 
effects on subsequent judgments of same race and other race groups and individuals.
99
  
They first randomly assigned participants in the study to a colorblind or multicultural 
mindset, which was induced by having them read a short article advocating for either a 
colorblind approach that favors seeing all people as individuals or a multicultural 
approach that favors acknowledging and appreciating racial group differences.  They then 
wrote five points in favor of adopting a colorblind versus multicultural approach 
depending on the condition they were assigned to.
100
  Wolsko found that those in both 
colorblind and multicultural conditions showed less ingroup favoritism
101
 in the form of 
less positive ratings for the participant‘s own group compared to a control group that did 
not adopt either a colorblind or multicultural mindset.
102
  There were differences between 
those in the colorblind and multicultural conditions though, as the colorblind group 
expressed lower levels of stereotypicality
103
 of blacks.  Simply put, those in the 
colorblind condition associated blacks less strongly with typical black stereotypes, 
                                               
94 Id. at 649 (explaining that colorblindness is a means to demonstrating that one is not a racist by adopting 
that perspective that ―If I do not notice race, then I cannot be racist‖). 
95 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (―The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimination on the basis of race.‖). 
96 Wolsko et al., supra note 91 (demonstrating that multiculturalism can have the ironic effect of increasing 
stereotyping). 
97 Colorblindness only requires that people avoid noticing and mentioning race as opposed to noticing and 
appreciating the similarities and differences between racial groups, as is required by multiculturalism. 
98 In fact, people automatically see and sort others into social categories, particularly race but also gender 
and age groups, within milliseconds.  See Ito & Urland, supra note 83.  
99 Wolsko et al., supra note 91.  
100 Id. at 638.  
101 Marilyn B. Brewer, Ingroup Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive—Motivational 
Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 207 (1979) (defining in-group favoritism as ―attitudinal and perceptual 
biases in favor of members of one‘s own group over members of other groups‖). 
102 Wolsko et al., supra note 91, at 639 tbl.2. 
103 Stereotypicality is the tendency to perceive individuals as prototypical of a general stereotype. 
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whereas those in the multicultural group expressed higher levels of stereotypicality of 
blacks on both positive and negative stereotypes.
104
  That is, those participants in the 
multicultural condition perceived black targets to be more prototypical of a stereotypical 
black person (for example, less intelligent and more athletic) than those participants in 
the colorblind condition. 
¶41 In two additional studies, Wolsko and his colleagues found additional effects such 
that those in a colorblind mindset thought that the goals of blacks and whites were more 
similar than those in the multicultural mindset.
105
  Those in a colorblind mindset ignored 
racial category membership when forming impressions of target people, whereas those in 
the multicultural mindset did not ignore this information.
106
  It might seem fair to 
conclude that the individuals in the colorblind mindset were performing better with 
regard to the task of appearing tolerant and not letting race influence their judgments, but 
additional findings from this same research suggest that the use of racial category 
information by those in the multicultural condition made them more accurate in their 




¶42 Researchers conducted another study using children‘s performance in a ―guess-
who‖ game that requires the use of visual characteristics to narrow down a pool of 
potential matches to one.
108
  The game was set up as either race-neutral or race-relevant, 
such that in one version (the race-neutral version), the race of the people in the pool was 
not helpful in differentiating between individuals, and in the other version (the race-
relevant version), it was useful.
109
  The study compared the performance of younger and 
older children to demonstrate that the older children, being more likely to have 
internalized the colorblind norms of society, would perform worse in the race-relevant 
version of the game because they would be reluctant to use relevant race information 
during the game.  In fact, Professor Evan Apfelbaum and his colleagues did find that 
older students took longer to play the game (i.e., they had to ask more questions to arrive 
at the correct target) than younger students, thereby performing worse when racial 
information was relevant.
110
  Taken together, the research of Professors Wolsko and 
Apfelbaum suggests that accuracy and performance in a social task or interaction may be 
impaired by a colorblind approach that inhibits the use of race even when it is relevant 
information in a social interaction. 
¶43 Research continues to tease apart the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
colorblindness and multiculturalism for interracial interactions.  For example, Professor 
Apfelbaum and his colleagues have argued that people use colorblindness strategically to 
avoid talking about race when they think it may make them appear racist, such as in 
interracial interactions.
111
  In three studies, they examined the efficacy of this ―strategic 
                                               
104 Wolsko et al., supra note 91, at 639 tbl.1.  
105 Id. at 644 tbl.4. 
106 Id. at 647 tbl.6.  
107 Id. at 643, 648. 
108 Evan P. Apfelbaum, Kristin Pauker, Nalini Ambady, Samuel R. Sommers & Michal I. Norton, Learning 
(Not) to Talk About Race: When Older Children Underperform in Social Categorization, 44 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1513 (2008). 
109 Id. at 1514 fig.1. 
110 Id. at 1515 fig.2.  
111 Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81.  
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colorblindness‖112 for fostering racial tolerance.  In their first study, white participants 
who were most concerned about appearing prejudiced were also the most likely to adopt 
a colorblind approach, yet this had the ironic effect of making these same individuals 
appear less friendly to the black interaction partners they completed a ―guess-who‖ game 
similar to the one described above with,
113
 increasing the chance that their black 
interaction partners might think their unfriendly behavior was due to bias.
114
  
¶44 A second study found that adopting a colorblind approach and avoiding the topic 
of race required cognitive resources.  When using this strategy in an interracial 
interaction, it depleted the individuals of valuable cognitive resources necessary for 
exhibiting positive nonverbal behaviors.
115
  This made them less able to monitor their 
actual behaviors to ensure a friendly interaction.
116
  Whites who were most likely to 
adopt a colorblind approach also believed that those who exhibit colorblindness are less 
prejudiced than those who acknowledge race for any reason, as demonstrated in a third 
study.
117
  Unfortunately, this stood in sharp contrast to the perceptions of the black 
interaction partners of these individuals.  While those who presented themselves as 
colorblind believed they appeared the most non-prejudiced (compared to those who 
acknowledged race), their interaction partners interpreted their attitude as evidence of 
racial bias rather than evidence of non-bias.
118
  
¶45 In a final study, a qualifying condition of the backlash effect (in other words, the 
effect that those who thought they were the most non-biased were perceived as the most 
biased) was found.
119
  In situations where race was relatively less relevant or completely 
irrelevant to the interaction, colorblindness corresponded to perceptions of less bias.  That 
is, when race was irrelevant, individuals taking a colorblind approach in the interaction 
were perceived as the least biased, in accordance with their views of themselves as non-
biased.  This finding highlights that colorblindness is not entirely bad and can be 
effective under particular conditions.
120
  As was the case in this study, when it did not 
make sense to bring up the topic of race during the interaction, those who avoided doing 
so (by adopting a colorblind approach) were perceived as less biased.
121
  Unfortunately, 
given the salience of race, there are many times when race is, in fact, relevant.  Ignoring 
the relevance of race at those times, then, is clearly detrimental.  
¶46 The ironic effects of colorblindness in interracial interactions have also been 
demonstrated by Professor Jennifer Richeson and her colleagues.  They, too, have 
demonstrated that the desire to appear unprejudiced, which presumably includes 
appearing colorblind for many people, ironically negatively impacts interracial 
                                               
112 Id. at 918. 
113 Id. at 922. 
114 Id. at 926. 
115 Id. at 924.  
116 Id. at 925. 
117 Id. at 927 fig.3.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 929 fig.4.  Professor Correll and his colleagues also suggest that whether a situation is 
characterized by high or low conflict may also make colorblindness a more or less efficacious strategy for 
dealing with intergroup relations in these circumstances.  Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park & J. Allegra 
Smith, Colorblind and Multicultural Prejudice Reduction Strategies in High-Conflict Situation, 11 GROUP 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 471 (2008). 
121 Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81, at 928. 
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interactions by leading to more negative reactions from other race interaction partners, as 
well as increased perceptions of bias for the white participants who are the most 
motivated to appear non-prejudiced.
122
  In a set of studies pitting a multicultural approach 
against a colorblind approach, those who adopted a colorblind approach to interracial 
interactions also exhibited higher levels of racial bias on both explicit (self-reported, 
deliberative responses) and implicit (automatic responses) measures of prejudice.
123
  
These results are directly counter to the goals of colorblindness espoused by many who 
adopt the approach as a means to decrease bias.  
¶47 Professor Jacquie Vorauer and her colleagues have examined the relationship 
between multicultural and colorblind approaches and their effects on interracial contact 
from the perspective of both interaction partners as well.
124
  In two studies, Professor 
Vorauer showed that a multicultural approach, which she argues caused people in 
interactions to focus more on their interaction partners, led to more positive interracial 
interactions than a colorblind approach, which led people to be self-focused in order to 
monitor their thoughts and behavior in the interaction.
125
  Thus, again, research suggests 
that colorblindness in an interracial interaction is cognitively taxing and possibly prevents 
positive interracial interactions from occurring.  
¶48 However, Professors Nicole Shelton and Jennifer Richeson demonstrated a 
possible ironic effect in favor of colorblindness when they demonstrated that high-bias 
whites interacting with black partners were better liked than low-bias whites.
126
  They 
argue that this appears to occur because high-bias whites try harder to overcome their 
bias in interactions with people of other races (with strategies including behaving in a 
colorblind manner) in order to avoid appearing prejudiced.  Low-bias whites, however, 
may make less of an effort because they believe it is apparent to their black interaction 
partner that they are low in bias.
127
  Taken together, these studies suggest that 
colorblindness may be an effective strategy for some under certain conditions, but they 
largely highlight that a colorblind approach can be problematic in the very situations it is 
supposed to be most useful for. 
¶49 Psychologists, in light of the research discussed above, have also been interested in 
the underlying variables leading to the often negative effects of colorblindness.  One such 
variable underlying the negative effects observed in interracial interactions may be a 
within-person divergence between what an individual explicitly communicates about 
their racial bias and the implicit bias operating outside of one‘s conscious control.  
Colorblindness may lead one to express less bias explicitly but may actually exacerbate 
bias implicitly.  A study of bias at these two levels (explicit and implicit) found that 
individuals in a colorblind mindset in a high-intergroup conflict situation (in other words, 
a situation involving intergroup competition for scarce resources) expressed less bias 
                                               
122 See Sophie Trawalter, Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Predicting Behavior During Interracial 
Interactions: A Stress and Coping Approach, 13 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 243 (2009); J. Nicole 
Shelton, Jennifer A. Richeson, Jessica Salvatore & Sophie Trawalter, Ironic Effects of Racial Bias During 
Interracial Interactions, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 397 (2005); Richeson & Nussbaum, supra note 92. 
123 Richeson & Nussbaum, supra note 92.  
124 Jacquie D. Vorauer, Annette Gagnon & Stacey J. Sasaki, Salient Intergroup Ideology and Intergroup 
Interaction, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 838 (2009). 
125 Id.  
126 Shelton et al., supra note 122. 
127 Id. at 5. 
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explicitly (as measured by questions gauging explicit self-reported feelings toward 
another group), but exhibited greater bias at an implicit level (as measured by a task that 
captures automatic responses).
128
  Implicit bias, regardless of explicit, self-reported bias, 
can affect subsequent behaviors and judgments in negative ways, producing displays of 




¶50 In addition, they found that the same colorblind participants who expressed less 
explicit bias during the high-conflict situation experienced a rebound effect such that 
twenty minutes later they expressed greater explicit bias than their baseline.
130
  For those 
participants in a multicultural mindset, their level of bias of both kinds (explicit, self-
report and automatic, implicit associations) increased in the high-conflict situation and 
decreased slightly twenty minutes after considering the situation, demonstrating a 
correspondence between the two levels of bias, as well as an absence of the ironic effect 
that led colorblind individuals to express greater bias after the fact.
131
 
¶51 As some of the research discussed above has suggested, it is important to consider 
the effect that various approaches to diversity have on those they are meant to protect and 
benefit.  The interracial interaction studies discussed above suggest that the perceptions 
of whites and blacks in interracial interactions can diverge significantly.  Whites often 
leave interactions feeling good about their ability to behave in a non-biased way and the 
positivity of their other race partner‘s perceptions of them, whereas blacks participating 
in the same interactions see many of the same behaviors as evidence of racial bias and 
find their other race partners unfriendly.  
B. Preferences for Diversity Ideology 
¶52 There are other ways in which reactions to colorblindness and multiculturalism 
diverge.  For example, majority and minority groups tend to differ in terms of their 
overall preferences for one approach or the other.  Presumably this is because of different 
motivations for adopting a particular approach and different life experiences that lead one 
to value different aspects of the two approaches.
132
  In addition, majority and minority 
group status, as well as preferences for colorblindness versus multiculturalism, may also 
lead to differences in perceptions of issues around race and equality, which creates 
problems when working toward resolving the racial inequalities that still exist.
133
 
¶53 Using a sample of participants in a diversity workshop (a situation with a likely 
selection effect such that those in the diversity workshop were already more likely to care 
about diversity issues and possibly were likely to exhibit less intergroup bias), Professor 
                                               
128 Id. at 487. 
129 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006). 
130 Correll et al., supra note 120, at 487; see also C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Bodenhausen, A. B. Milne & J. 
Jetten, Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
808 (1994) (demonstrating that suppressing stereotypes or biased thoughts that come to mind leads them to 
re-emerge stronger than before they were suppressed, leading to even more bias). 
131 Correll et al., supra note 120, at 487.  
132 See, e.g., Ryan et al., supra note 5; Andrew R. Todd & Adam Galinsky, The Intimate Connection 
Between Self-Regulatory and Ideological Approaches to Managing Diversity (Nov. 9, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
133 Todd & Galinsky, supra note 132. 
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Carey Ryan and her colleagues investigated relative preferences for colorblind versus 
multicultural approaches between white majority group members and black minority 
group members.
134
  In the first study, Professor Ryan found that white participants were 
more likely to endorse a colorblind ideology than black participants, and that black 
participants were more likely to endorse a multicultural ideology than a colorblind 
ideology.
135
  Further, they found that whereas whites who endorsed a colorblind ideology 
perceived more similarities between blacks and whites, blacks who endorsed a 
multicultural ideology showed a similar effect, suggesting that the different approaches 
produce similar results for different groups of people.
136
  
¶54 In a second study, black participants thought that a multicultural approach would 
lead to more positive interactions, whereas white participants thought that a colorblind 
approach would lead to more positive intergroup interactions.
137
  Professor Ryan argues 
that colorblindness is preferred by majority groups because it is easy and justifies the 
status quo,
138
 making it unnecessary to deal with the continuing presence of racial 
prejudice and inequality.
139
  This same argument has been made by proponents of race-
consciousness in the law.
140
 
¶55 Similar group preferences for colorblindness and multiculturalism exist in the 
business context.  Professor Flannery Stevens and her colleagues argue that minority 
group members prefer workplaces and diversity ideologies in the workplace that are 
multicultural, allowing them to utilize and express the different perspectives that may 
result from their experience as members of non-majority social groups.
141
  Furthermore, 
researchers have also demonstrated that the psychological engagement of minority group 
members in the workplace is greater in a setting where dominant group members prefer 
multiculturalism to colorblindness.
142
  On the other hand, majority group members dislike 
multicultural approaches, at least those that seem to exclude majority group culture, 
because they feel overlooked as unimportant contributors to diversity.
143
  Instead, as 




C. Perpetuating Prejudice 
¶56 If colorblindness can be seen as a means to avoid addressing issues of race, then it 
is also informative as to whether adopting a colorblind or multicultural mindset is likely 
to affect one‘s perceptions of discrimination and bias.  While it has been argued that the 
use of racial categories must be avoided in order to avoid discriminating on the basis of 
                                               
134 Ryan et al., supra note 5.  
135 Id. at 623 tbl.2. 
136 Id. at 624 fig.1. 
137 Id. at 631. 
138 Id. at 632. 
139 Id. at 619. 
140 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 73. 
141 Stevens et al., supra note 6. 
142 Victoria C. Plaut, Kecia M. Thomas & Matt J. Goren, Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for 
Minorities?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 444, 445 (2009).  
143 Stevens et al., supra note 6, at 121. 
144 Id. at 120. 
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race, it is also possible that avoiding racial categories could perpetuate continuing 
prejudice and discrimination. 
¶57 Colorblindness has been shown to lead children to recount situations involving 
racial bias in ways that downplay the relevance or seriousness of race and racial bias, 
even in situations where its relevance is blatant.
145
  In their study, they put children in 
either a colorblind or multicultural (or ―value-diversity‖)146 mindset by exposing them to 
messages advocating for one approach or the other.
147
  They then exposed them to 
interactions between students involving no-bias, ambiguous bias, or blatant bias.  In the 
blatant bias situation, the children learned that a white child engaged in an unprovoked 
physical assault of a black child based on the stereotype that blacks are aggressive.  Of 
those in the multicultural mindset, 77 percent of them perceived bias in the blatant bias 
scenario, whereas only 50 percent of those in the colorblind mindset did.
148
  
¶58 In addition, when students were asked to explain what happened in these scenarios, 
those in a colorblind mindset were less likely to mention race or to describe the incident 
as serious enough to warrant teacher intervention, suggesting a downplaying (intentional 
or not) of the blatant racial bias aspect contained in the scenario.
149
 
¶59 Professors Andrew Todd and Adam Galinsky conducted related research with 
adults investigating the effect that colorblind versus multicultural ideologies have on 
perceptions of racial progress and prevalence of ongoing discrimination.
150
  In this 
research, Professor Todd demonstrated that white study participants who took the 
perspective of a Latino person during the course of the experiment, thus adopting a 
perspective that made racial differences more salient (including differences in likelihood 
of experiencing prejudice and discrimination), increased the white participants‘ 
perceptions of racial inequality and increased their support for social policies directed at 
redressing historical and contemporary racial biases.
151
  Further, in another study, 
Professor Todd found that white study participants who were primed with a multicultural 
approach to diversity compared to a colorblind approach were also more likely to report 
greater perceptions of racial inequality and support for social policies directed at 
redressing historical and contemporary racial inequalities, such as affirmative action.
152 
 
D. When Colorblindness is Beneficial 
¶60 As alluded to above, it is unfair to say that adopting a colorblind approach is 
completely ineffective as a strategy for dealing with diversity issues.  For example, where 
race is irrelevant, taking a colorblind approach and avoiding mention of race has positive 
effects for both parties in the interaction.
153
  In addition, in high conflict situations (those 
involving high levels of potential intergroup conflict or competition), it may be beneficial 
                                               
145 Evan P. Apfelbaum, Kristin Pauker, Samuel R. Sommers & Nalini Ambady, In Blind Pursuit of Racial 
Equality?, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1587 (2010). 
146 Id. at 1588. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1589–90. 
149 Id. at 1590. 
150 Todd & Galinsky, supra note 132. 
151 Id. at 16–17.  
152 Id. at 18.  
153 Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81. 
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to take a colorblind approach because it leads to decreased expressions of explicit bias in 
the midst of the high conflict intergroup situation, which may serve to smooth over the 
situation in the moment.
154
 
¶61 In general, however, research suggests that under many circumstances 
colorblindness is detrimental to everyone involved.  For majority group members or 
others adopting this approach, it can lead to increased likelihood of being seen as biased 
in interracial interactions,
155
 as well as decreases in efficiency, performance,
156
 and 
awareness of social realities of inequality.
157
  For minority groups, the effects are equally 
negative, as individuals in these groups may face unfriendly interactions with people 
perceived to be biased against them,
158
 denial of social realities of inequality that affect 
their lives,
159
 denial of social identities that are important to them
160
 and their well-
being,
161
 and even increased experiences of bias.
162
  
¶62 Given this, the best approach to dealing with diversity in society as a whole and 
the domain of law specifically is unlikely to be colorblindness.  True colorblindness does 
not exist and it may not even be desirable if it were to exist.
163
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V. CAN THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL EQUALITY BE COLORBLIND? 
¶63 Can the pursuit of racial equality, under the law and in society more generally, be 
racially blind?  Assuming the best intentions for those committed to the colorblind ideal, 
the evidence indicates that colorblindness is neither entirely possible in its most simplistic 
form, nor is it desirable for achieving the goals underlying any approach to diversity: 
eliminating bias and improving intergroup relations.  
A. Benefits to the Majority Group 
¶64 First and foremost, the psychological evidence reviewed above demonstrates the 
many negative consequences of a colorblind ideology for both majority and minority 
group members.  In general, any benefit derived from a colorblind ideology tends to favor 
the majority group, which fails to serve the very goals of any diversity ideology.  The fact 
that this approach favors the majority group in a number of important ways is even 
offered as a reason why majority groups tend to favor such an approach to dealing with 
diversity, undermining the egalitarian goals of diversity approaches. 
¶65 Many legal and psychological scholars alike agree that the primary benefit of a 
colorblind approach to racial diversity is experienced by whites.  While minority groups 
disfavor a colorblind approach because it denies their non-majority identities, majority 
group members prefer such a strategy because it affords them the opportunity to avoid 
dealing with racial issues.
164
  In addition, majority group members may also prefer 
colorblindness because it serves as a means to maintain the status quo by obstructing 
efforts to monitor existing inequalities that work largely in their favor as the majority.
165
   
Empirical evidence from psychological research demonstrates majority group preferences 
for colorblindness compared to minority group members.  For example, even among 
individuals voluntarily participating in a diversity workshop (thus presumably 
predisposed toward less bias and more interest in positive intergroup relations), whites 
favored a colorblind approach more than blacks did, while blacks favored a multicultural 
approach.
166
  These groups disagreed on which approach would lead to more positive 
intergroup interaction, with each group favoring their own preference as the best means 
to achieve racial harmony.
167
  
¶66 The theory behind the preferences of majority and minority groups demonstrated 
in these empirical studies are echoed in the discussions of legal scholars.  That is, 
majority group members prefer the colorblind approach because, for example, they are 
motivated to maintain their own higher social status, they are motivated to avoid the 
threat of being faced with the realities of racial disparities resulting from racial 




                                               
164 See Duncan, Jr., supra note 72.  
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168 The belief that mentioning race in any circumstance could lead to accusations (implicitly or explicitly) 
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B. Negative Consequences for Interracial Contact 
¶67 Empirical evidence suggests that adopting a colorblind approach in interracial 
interactions, the very interactions where colorblind proponents believe it is most 
beneficial, can actually lead to negative outcomes.  For example, those that adopted a 
colorblind approach in an interaction involving a task where race was relevant, although 
neutral, also exhibited less friendly non-verbal behaviors toward their partners.
169
  These 
negative non-verbal behaviors led their other race interaction partners to perceive them as 
less friendly.
170
  In addition, individuals who were most committed to appearing non-
prejudiced were also more likely to be disliked by their interaction partners.
171
  In fact, 
these interactions sometimes resulted in prejudiced individuals being more liked by their 
other race interaction partners than those who were less prejudiced.
172
  Ironically, those 
who were most set on demonstrating their lack of prejudice by adopting a colorblind 
approach, interacted in a more negative way with their other race partners compared to 
those who were not concerned with their level of prejudice (regardless of level) because 
their heightened concerns about how they appeared led them to be less comfortable in the 
interaction.
173
  At the same time, these white participants were not aware of the ironic 
effect that their adherence to colorblindness had on their black interaction partner‘s 
perceptions.  Instead, these white participants often believed that these interactions had 
gone smoothly, that their black partners had liked them, and that they had appeared non-
prejudiced.
174
  Thus, not only did the interactions sour from the perspective of the people 
who the ―colorblind‖ whites sought to impress but these white participants did not know 
they in fact offended their black interaction partners. 
C. Awareness of the Reality of Inequality 
¶68 Empirical evidence supports the theory of legal scholars that colorblindness 
obscures racial inequalities.  A colorblind mindset may lead individuals to perceive less 
racial inequality and show less support for social policies directed at remedying social 
inequalities.
175
  In addition, the default mindset of many majority group members is 
colorblindness, suggesting that they tend to see less racial inequality and show less 
support for social policies directed at addressing it than other groups, particularly 
minority groups for whom existing racial inequality is a more salient concern.
176
 
D. Race Consciousness is Required 
¶69 Despite the great strides toward racial equality, we are by no means living in a 
post-racial society.  Racial inequality persists throughout American society,
177
 either as a 
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result of historical legacy and institutional perpetuation or as a result of continued 
contemporary racial biases that result in experiences of prejudice and discrimination in 
the everyday lives of racial minorities.  In addition, recent social psychological research 
helps reveal the ways in which racial biases, regardless of intentionality, may impact 
society generally and the legal domain in particular.  For example, Professor Jennifer 
Eberhardt and her colleagues showed, using real-world data from death penalty cases, 
that defendants with more afrocentric (more stereotypically black) features were more 
likely to get the death penalty.
178
  In addition to demonstrating the continued importance 
of race, this research serves as a reminder that the data necessary to discover this biased 
pattern would not be possible if there was an effort to be colorblind, as a colorblind 
approach could preclude collection of data about racial group membership for any reason.  
Thus, in a truly colorblind world, no one could argue that racial sentencing disparities 
exist, for example, because race would no longer be recognized as a valid category that 
bias could derive from. 
E. Conclusion 
¶70 Despite recent court cases, such as Ricci v. DeStefano,179 which have sought a 
return to the anti-discrimination principle as interpreted in the nineteenth century, a 
commitment to anti-discrimination requires a commitment to race-consciousness, not 
colorblindness.  The courts and society at large should give up the dream of the 
colorblind ideal as the approach best able to address the realities of race relations in the 
United States.  The colorblind ideal now serves simply to distract society from achieving 
true equality, which results not from avoiding seeing differences, but from appreciating 
those differences in a way that does not disadvantage one group relative to another.  As 
long as racial inequalities exist, adherence to the anti-discrimination principle requires 
monitoring of the relative social status of different racial groups in order to track progress 
toward equality, as well as to avoid reverting back to old patterns. 
¶71 Despite the emphasis on the comparison between colorblindness and 
multiculturalism as strategies for contending with a diverse society, giving up on 
colorblindness does not necessarily require adopting a multicultural approach.  Rather, 
the law should remain race-conscious, because, as this Comment demonstrates, race-
consciousness reflects the reality of the social world.  In arguing for race-consciousness, 
it is not necessary to argue for changes in procedure that recognize different cultural 
practices, as might be required by a true multicultural approach.  Rather, the emphasis 
should be on maintaining an awareness of the realities of race in a legal system and 
society that faces pervasive stratification on the basis of race every day.
180
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¶72 The continued attack on anti-discrimination law and affirmative action is likely to 
keep the debate about colorblindness versus race-consciousness alive.  Hopefully, 
lawyers and judges will look to empirical realities to ground arguments for race-
consciousness.  In addition, if the voices for race-consciousness can speak loudly and 
persuasively, it may be enough to push back the erosion that has long been underway of 
an anti-discrimination principle that recognizes the continuing reality of inequality and 
provides the means to continue to address this reality.  
